An ordinal game theory approach to the analysis and selection of partners in public:Private partnership projects by Ouenniche, Jamal
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An ordinal game theory approach to the analysis and selection of
partners in public
Citation for published version:
Ouenniche, J 2015, 'An ordinal game theory approach to the analysis and selection of partners in public:
Private partnership projects' Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications. DOI: 10.1007/s10957-015-
0844-3
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1007/s10957-015-0844-3
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Published In:
Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
J Optim Theory Appl
DOI 10.1007/s10957-015-0844-3
An Ordinal Game Theory Approach to the Analysis and
Selection of Partners in Public–Private Partnership
Projects
Jamal Ouenniche1 · Aristotelis Boukouras2 ·
Mohammad Rajabi1
Received: 20 August 2015 / Accepted: 6 November 2015
© The Author(s) 2015. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract Nowadays, public–private partnership projects have become a standard for
delivering public services in both developed and developing countries. In this paper,
we are concerned with the analysis of private sector proposals and the selection of the
private sector partner to whom to award the contract. To the best of our knowledge,
this problem has not been addressed within a game theory framework. To fill this
gap, we model this decision problem as a static non-cooperative game of complete
information and propose a new ordinal game theory algorithm for finding an optimal
generalized Nash equilibrium. The proposed algorithm determines a single ranking of
proposals or bidders that takes account of multiple performance criteria and reflects
both the public sector and the private sector perspectives, and can handle any number
of private sector players and any number of contractual terms. An illustrative scenario
is provided to guide the reader through the workings of the proposed ordinal game
theory algorithm. The proposed ordinal game theory-based analysis framework can
be used by the private sector to analyse any set of potential proposals most likely to
be submitted by bidders and to assist with the choice of bidding strategies, and by
the public sector player to analyse any set of potential proposals most likely to be
submitted under any set of contractual terms and to assist with the choice of a realistic
set of contractual terms and their performance measures.
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1 Introduction
Public services have traditionally been delivered by the public sector, e.g. national,
regional or local governments. Historically, these public services took many forms
including infrastructure projects and, in some cases, supply of necessity goods by
state-owned companies. Increasing concerns about the levels of public debt along
with a lack of effective and efficient management of these state-owned companies
have led to an important movement of privatization of these state-owned companies in
the 1980s championed by the UK [1,2] and the USA [3]. Advocates of this movement
often invoke the advantages of market mechanisms to justify this shift in public sector
management—although very often “balancing the books” was the main motivation.
For good surveys and books on privatization, the reader is referred to [4,5]. Later
on, additional factors led to the design and implementation of the concept of public–
private partnerships (PPPs) such as knowledge-intensive technologies, unprecedented
levels of public debts, poor public services and more demanding citizens.
Formally, a PPP project is a business agreement between the public sector and the
private sector to deliver a public service by jointly assuming, to varying extents, finan-
cial, technical and operational risks, where the public sector stakeholders typically
consist of national, regional and/or local governments, governmental agencies and
state-owned entities,whereas the private sector stakeholders typically consist of private
sub-contractors, private investors, financiers and insurers. In practice, these stakehold-
ers are brought together under a legal entity or organizational framework known as the
special purpose vehicle (SPV). The sharing of the costs of public services delivered by
means of PPP projects varies over a continuum ranging from fully assumed by the pub-
lic sector or taxpayers’ money, at one extreme, to fully assumed by the private sector
or investors’ money, at the other extreme, depending on the type of agreement or con-
tract, which is intimately related to the type of PPP project and the type of PPP model.
In general, PPP projects are divided into two broad categories depending on whether
their output is a public service for industry users or household users—these categories
of PPP projects are often referred to as economic infrastructure projects and social
infrastructure projects, respectively [6]. These categories could be further divided into
two sub-categories depending on whether the project infrastructure is hard or soft,
where hard infrastructures refer to transportation infrastructures (e.g. roads, highways,
railways, bridges, ports, airports, public transport), utility infrastructures (e.g. elec-
tricity and gas production, transmission and distribution; water storage, treatment and
distribution; sewerage and drainage network; industrial and household garbage collec-
tion, disposal and/or processing), telecommunication infrastructures (e.g. landline and
mobile telephone networks, internet networks) and energy infrastructures (e.g. power
generation and supply), whereas soft infrastructures refer to education infrastructures
(e.g. schools and universities, libraries, vocational training centres, technology trans-
fer agencies), healthcare infrastructures (e.g. hospitals, child care, aged care homes),
social infrastructures (e.g. social security system; a range of community services such
as housing, prisons and detention centres), leisure and tourism infrastructures (e.g. the-
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atres, museums, parks), environmental infrastructures (e.g. environmental agencies),
etc. On the other hand, PPPmodels are typically classified into five categories, namely
supply and management model; turnkey model; lease model; concession model; and
private ownership model [7], where the supply and management model consists of
subcontracting the management of a project, an activity, or a public entity to the pri-
vate sector; the turnkey model consists of subcontracting the realization of a project
(e.g. construction of a hard infrastructure project) to the private sector; the lease model
consists of subcontracting the operational management of a project to the private sec-
tor; the concession model consists of granting specific rights to the private sector for
building and operating a project for a fixed period of time; and the private ownership
model consists of using the private finance initiative (PFI) type of funding to design,
construct and operate a project by the private sector from which the public sector
purchases services. Furthermore, contracts could be divided into several categories
depending on the choice of the subset of activities, around which the contract terms
evolve, among the following: finance; design; build or rehabilitate or modernize or
extend; transfer or lease or own; and operate.Well-known examples of contract designs
in PPPs are build–operate–transfer (BOT) contracts and build–lease–transfer (BLT)
contracts—for more variety of contract designs and case studies, the reader is referred
to [8,9].
The concept of public–private partnerships has attracted worldwide attention and
acquired a new resonance in the context of developed and developing countries.
PPPs are increasingly heralded as an innovative policy tool for remedying the lack
of dynamism in traditional public service delivery. Several types of analyses have
been proposed to address PPP projects including multi-criteria decision analysis1
(e.g. [10]) and game theory. A game theory-based analysis models a PPP project as
a game, where the players are often divided into two main categories, namely the
public sector player(s) and the private sector players. To the best of our knowledge,
contributions within this analysis framework make use of the Cardinal game theory
modelling framework to analyse various decisions in PPP projects. To be more spe-
cific, the various decisions in PPP projects that have been addressed so far include
bidding price [11], bid compensation for projects with costly bid preparation [12];
concession period—also referred to as stipend or honorarium [13–15]; costs and ben-
efits allocation [16], risk sharing and allocation [17]; resource pricing and allocation
[18], resource value increment allocation [19], royalties and subsidies negotiation
[20], negotiation of changes in output-based specifications [21] and claims, financial
renegotiations, and opportunistic behaviour [22–24]. To be the best of our knowledge,
so far the decision problem concerned with the selection of the private sector part-
ners has not been addressed yet within a game theory framework, although—at least
conceptually—game theory is the most suitable analysis and solution framework as,
by design, it allows one to take account of both the public sector perspective and the
public sector perspective, and hence, it provides a more realistic solution for imple-
mentation. The importance of this problem and the proposed contribution of this paper
1 Multi-criteria decision analysis-based solutions to some PPP decision problems only take account of one
perspective at a time. The superiority of a game theory-based solution lies it its ability, by design, to take
account of multiple perspectives at the same time.
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lies in the consequences of a wrong choice of a private sector partner such as higher
costs of realization of the project and further renegotiations, on the one hand, and the
lack of more appropriate decision support systems, which take account of both the
public sector and the private sector perspectives, to assist with the analysis of proposals
and decision-making, on the other hand.
Our survey of the literature revealed that the common assumption made by
researchers in this area is that stakeholders have well-defined payoff functions with
respect to the key decision variables in PPP games, and thus, researchers have focused
exclusively on Cardinal game theory type of analysis. In sum, our survey on cardinal
game theory for PPPs highlights two shortcomings to the current published litera-
ture. First, in very many types of applications including PPPs, the specification of
a cardinal payoff function is either infeasible or inappropriate. To be more specific,
very often, the specification of a cardinal payoff function—also referred to as a utility
function—requires the analyst to adopt simplifying assumptions with respect to the
behaviour of players or the relationships between different decision variables. In prac-
tice, however, stakeholders may not be able to represent their preferences with payoff
functions, especially under multiple criteria, but they may still be able to rank, with
respect to multiple performance criteria or contractual terms, the alternatives they face
from best to worst, which makes ordinal game theory type of analysis an alternative
methodology for PPP projects. Second, most of the literature made a limited use of
the potential of game theory as a modelling and analysis framework of PPPs in that
only a limited number of decision variables relevant to most decision environments
have been considered. In this research, we intend to fill these two gaps by provid-
ing an alternative framework, namely an ordinal game theory framework to analyse
competitive bidding between private sector potential stakeholders for winning a PPP
contract under multiple contractual terms or performance criteria related to these con-
tractual terms. To be more specific, we provide a general ordinal game theory-based
framework for analysing multiple contractual terms-based proposals in PPP projects
along with an algorithm for the identification of the equilibrium or, equivalently, for
predicting the contest’s winner. In sum, the proposed algorithm is a tool to assist with
the selection of the private sector player to award the PPP contract to or the private
sector players to shortlist for further negotiation. The main attractive features of the
proposed algorithm could be summarized as follows: (1) it can handle any number of
private sector players and any number of contractual terms and related performance
criteria, (2) it determines a single ranking of proposals or bidders that take account of
multiple performance criteria and reflects both the public sector perspective and the
private sector perspective—as represented by their preference systems, (3) it can be
used by the private sector players to analyse any set of potential proposals most likely
to be submitted by bidders and to assist with the choice of bidding strategies, and (4) it
can be used by the public sector player to analyse any set of potential proposals most
likely to be submitted under any set of contractual terms and to assist with the choice
of a realistic set of contractual terms and their performance measures. Note that, to the
best of our knowledge, the only papers on ordinal game theory with methodological
contributions are the ones by Cruz and Simaan [25], Xu [26] and Durieu et al. [27].
In the next section, we propose an ordinal game theory-based analysis framework for
PPPs along with a new algorithm for its operationalization. As compared to the ordinal
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game theory frameworks proposed by Cruz and Simaan [25] and Xu [26], our frame-
work is more general in that it can model games with any finite number of players,
whereas [25] only considers two players and [26] considers the cases of two and three
players, respectively. As to [27], they present a general model with any finite number
of players, but they do not provide an algorithm for finding equilibria as we do in this
paper. Also, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to propose an ordinal
game theory framework for the selection of private sector partners in PPP projects.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we propose an
ordinal game theory-based framework for selecting private sector partner(s) in PPPs
and provide the means for its operationalization, namely an algorithm for finding an
ordinal Nash equilibrium. We also provide relevant PPP-related concepts and tools.
In Sect. 3, we analyse a typical scenario and use it to illustrate and discuss how the
proposed methodology works. Finally, Sect. 4 concludes the paper.
2 General Framework and Analysis
In this section, we propose an ordinal game theory-based framework for analysing
competitive bidding between private sector potential partners for winning a PPP con-
tract and provide the means for its operationalization, namely an algorithm for finding
an ordinal non-cooperative equilibrium or, equivalently, for predicting the contest’s
winner. We also provide the relevant PPP-related concepts and tools required for oper-
ationalizing the proposed framework. In sum, the proposed framework models a PPP
project as an ordinal game between a public sector representative or player (e.g. a city
council) and several private sector players, that is, private sector entities bidding for a
PPP project, say P1, . . ., PN . For modelling purposes, we shall assume that the PPP
project is fully described by means of a set of K contract terms and that the measures
of the performance criteria used to assess the quality of any proposal on such terms
are specified by the public sector representative. To comply with a common practice,
we assume that each private sector player Pi (i := 1, . . . , N ) submits a single pro-
posal, say xi := (xi1, . . . , xiK
)
, to the public sector representative as part of the bidding
process, where proposals are represented by vectors belonging to the K -dimensional
Euclidean space I RK . Let Xi :=
{
xij :=
(
xi1, j , . . . , x
i
K , j
)
; j := 1 . . . , Mi
}
denotes
the set of potential proposals used by Pi (i := 1, . . . , N ) for analysis purposes, where
Mi denotes the cardinality of Xi . Formally, we model a PPP project as a static non-
cooperative ordinal game of complete information among the private sector players,
where private sector players’ strategies are the proposals they submit to the public
sector representative. Note that, from a modelling perspective, the public sector repre-
sentative is not formally modelled as a player in our game, as its actions depend purely
on the proposals of the private sector players; that is, the public sector representative
simply ranks the private sector bidders based on their proposals and selects the best
one. Therefore, we shall refer to the public sector representative as a “silent” player.
Nonetheless, the outcome of the game is based on the public sector representative’s
preferences as reflected in the ranking of the private sector players’ proposals.
In the remainder of this section, we shall denote by X the Cartesian product of Xi s,
that is, X := ∏Ni=1 Xi , and refer to its elements as strategy profiles; to bemore specific,
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a strategy profile x is a vector that consists of one strategy per private sector player Pi ,
say xi := (xi1, . . . , xiK
)
, that is, x := (x1, . . . , x N ). Thus, the main task of the public
sector representative consists of ranking individual strategies in each strategy profile
based on the public sector preferences; let r (x) := (r (x1) , . . . , r (x N )) denotes such
ranking, where r
(
xi
)
is a number between 1 and N that reflects the relative rank of
proposal xi with respect to the other proposals. Without loss of generality, we shall
assume that the lower the value assigned to r
(
xi
)
, the higher the ranking of xi . In this
paper, we distinguish between two types of outcomes, namely strategy profile-induced
outcomes and the final outcome of the game. A formal definition of a strategy profile-
induced outcome is as follows: a strategy profile x (x ∈ X) induced outcome, say
α (x), of the ordinal game consists of the strategy profile x itself, the induced ranking
r (x) of the private sector proposals by the public sector representative, and the best
induced potential agreement fn (x) between the private sector player who made the
best proposal, say Pn , and the public sector representative, that is, fn (x) := Pn ;
formally, α (x) := (x, r (x) , fn (x)). The set of all possible strategy profile-induced
outcomes shall be denoted by A (X) := {a (x) ; x ∈ X}. All strategy profiles are of
interest to private sector players from an analysis perspective; however, the public
sector representative main interest is in only one of these profiles, namely the one
that consists of the actual proposals submitted by the private sector players, which we
refer to as the final outcome of the game, or equivalently the induced ranking of such
profile.
Our ordinal game analysis framework requires the specification of a system of
preferences for both the public sector representative and the private sector players.2
Hereafter, we shall provide such preference systems for these categories of players.
2.1 Public Sector Player Preference System
2.1.1 Public Sector Player Rationality Assumption
The public sector representative has preferences with respect to proposals, which are
expressed in the form of an ordinal ranking r (x) and are assumed to be complete and
transitive.
This assumption is formalized as follows where, as we stated earlier, the better a
proposal, the lower the assigned number to its ranking:
• r (xi ) ≤ r (x j )means that the public sector representativeweakly prefers proposal
xi over proposal x j .
• r (xi ) < r (x j )means that the public sector representative strictly prefers proposal
xi over proposal x j .
2 Note that, since our game is one of complete information, it is implicitly assumed that the private sector
representatives know the preference systems of the other private sector representatives. This information is
required in our game (as in all games of complete information) in order for players to be able to predict the
stable outcome(s) of the game, i.e. the ordinal non-cooperative equilibrium (equilibria), and to make their
final choice of proposal. However, it is not an important limitation, as practitioners can apply simulation
methods to deal with situations where the preference systems of other players are unknown.
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• r (xi ) := r (x j ) means that the public sector representative is indifferent between
proposal xi and proposal x j .
• Completeness: r (xi ) ≤ r (x j ) or r (xi ) ≥ r (x j ) for all pairs (xi , x j ) ∈ Xi × X j .
• Transitivity: If r (xi ) ≤ r (x j ) and r (x j ) ≤ r (xh), then r (xi ) ≤ r (xh) for all(
xi , x j , xh
) ∈ Xi × X j × Xh .
2.2 Private Sector Players Preference System
2.2.1 Private Sector Players Rationality Assumption
Each private sector player Pi has preferences with respect to strategy profile-induced
outcomes, which are expressed in the form of an ordinal ranking r i (α (x)) over the
set of all possible strategy profile-induced outcomes A (X) and are assumed to be
complete and transitive.
This assumption is formalized by means of ordinal ranking r i that will be used to
rank order the strategy profile-induced outcomes taking account of the preferences of
the private sector player Pi (i := 1, . . . , N ). In sum, r i is defined as follows, where
the better a strategy profile-induced outcome, the lower the assigned number to its
ranking:
• r i (α (x)) ≤ r i (α (y))means that the private sector player Pi weakly prefers strat-
egy profile-induced outcome α (x) over strategy profile-induced outcome α (y).
• r i (α (x)) < r i (α (y))means that the private sector player Pi strictly prefers strat-
egy profile-induced outcome α (x) over strategy profile-induced outcome α (y).
• r i (α (x)) := r i (α (y)) means that the private sector player Pi is indifferent
between strategy profile-induced outcome α (x) and strategy profile-induced out-
come α (y).
• Completeness: r i (α (x)) ≤ r i (α (y)) or r i (α (x)) ≥ r i (α (y)) for all pairs
(α (x) , α (y)) ∈ A (X) × A (X).
• Transitivity: If r i (α (x)) ≤ r i (α (y)) and r i (α (y)) ≤ r i (α (z)), then r i (α (x)) ≤
r i (α (z)) for all (α (x) , α (y) , α (z)) ∈ A (X) × A (X) × A (X).
Beforewe proceed to themain analysis, we provide some important definitions regard-
ing the methodology and the solution concept. Given the notation we provided earlier,
we have the following definitions:
Definition 2.1 Ordinal Game of Private Sector Players’ Selection.
Given N private sector players, say P1, . . . , PN , the corresponding sets of potential
proposals considered for analysis purposes Xi (i := 1, . . . , N ), the induced set of
strategy profiles X := ∏Ni=1 Xi , the set of strategy profile-induced outcomes A (X),
and the preference systems used by the public sector representative, say r , and the
private sector players, say
{
r i , i := 1, . . . , N}, an ordinal game of private sector
players’ selection is defined by G := (P, (Xi )i∈P , A (X) , r,
(
r i
)
i∈P
)
, where P :=
{P1, . . . , PN }.
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Definition 2.2 Best Response Correspondence.
Let x−i denotes the strategy profile x without the proposal xi of the i th private sector
player, that is, x−i ∈ ∏Nj=1, j =i X j . Then, a strategy profile x could be rewritten as
x := (xi , x−i ). For private sector player Pi , his best response correspondence with
respect to a specific strategy profile x−i played by the other private sector players, say
xi
∗ (
x−i
)
, refers to the subset of his strategies that qualify as a best response to x−i ;
that is,
xi
∗ (
x−i
)
:=
{
xi ∈ Xi
∣∣∣r i
(
α
(
xi , x−i
))
≤ r i
(
α
(
zi , x−i
))
,∀zi ∈ Xi
}
.
Definition 2.3 Ordinal Non-cooperative Equilibrium (ONE).
A strategy profile xˆ := (xˆ i , xˆ−i ) is an ordinal non-cooperative equilibrium (ONE)
of the private sector players’ selection gameG if and only if xˆ i := xi∗ (xˆ−i ) for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , N } and players are assumed to make decisions independently. In sum, a
ONE is a strategy profile that no player is likely to unilaterally deviate from. Note
that a non-cooperative ordinal game G may have multiple ONEs, a single ONE or no
ONE.
2.3 Contract Award
Assuming that the ordinal game has a non-cooperative equilibrium, say xˆ , the final
outcome of the game is the xˆ-induced ranking of the proposals submitted by the private
sector players to the public sector representative. In sum, a contract shall be awarded to
the private sector player, say Pn , who submitted the proposal with the highest rankings;
that is, r
(
xˆn
) := 1.
Hereafter, we shall describe an algorithm that we propose for finding an ordinal
non-cooperative equilibrium (ONE) of an ordinal game, if any exists.
2.4 General Framework for PPPs: A Solution Algorithm
Inputs: Two main inputs are required to operationalize this framework. The first input
is a set of strategy profiles X to be used for analysis; that is, for each private sector
player Pi (i := 1, . . . , N ), a set of potential proposals Xi is available. The second
input is a description of the preference systems of the players participating in the game.
Step 1. Ranking of proposals from a public sector perspective For each strategy
profile x ∈ X , rank its proposals xi s according to the public sector representative
preferences, thus producing a ranking r (x) := (r (x1) , . . . , r (x N )) for each x .
Then sort r
(
x1
)
, . . . , r
(
x N
)
in ascending order and set fn (x) to the proposal
on the top of the list. In sum, determine the set of strategy profile-induced out-
comes A (X) := {a (x) ; x ∈ X}, where α (x) := (x, r (x) , fn (x)). In practice,
the ranking of proposals could be done by a simple lexicographic ordering sys-
tem, an MCDMmethod (e.g. ELECTRE methods, PROMETHEE methods, AHP,
TOPSIS) or a mathematical programming-based methodology (e.g. DEA).
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Step 2. Ranking of strategy profile-induced outcomes from a private sec-
tor perspective For each private sector player Pi (i := 1, . . . , N ), rank order
the strategy profile-induced outcomes, α (x) := (x, r (x) , fn (x)), computed
at the previous step according to Pi preferences. To be more specific, for
each private sector player Pi , strategy profile-induced outcomes, α (x) :=
(x1, . . . , xi , . . . , x N , r
(
x1
)
, . . . , r
(
xi
)
, . . . , r
(
x N
)
, fn (x)); x ∈ X , are first
sorted in ascending order with respect to the ranks assigned by the public sec-
tor representative, r
(
xi
)
. Notice that, for each private sector player Pi , the
set of strategy profile-induced outcomes would consist of two categories. The
first category or subset, say Xi1, consists of those strategy profile-induced out-
comes where player Pi is top-ranked by the public sector representative; that is,
Xi1 :=
{
x ∈ X ∣∣r (xi ) := 1}, whereas the second category or subset, say Xi2, con-
sists of those strategy profile-induced outcomes where player Pi is outranked;
that is, Xi2 :=
{
x ∈ X ∣∣r (xi ) = 1}. Then, these sorted subsets of strategy profile-
induced outcomes Xi1 and X
i
2 are each lexicographically ordered according to x
i
entries and Pi preferences if and only if Xi1 is non-empty—otherwise none of the
proposals of player Pi are competitive enough to qualify Pi . Finally, ranks by Pi
are assigned accordingly. Notice that the above-mentioned condition enhances the
computational efficiency of our algorithm, on the one hand, and allows one to
discard any private sector player whose proposals are outranked by other private
sector players’ proposals, on the other hand. In order to keep track of the public
sector rankings, for each strategy profile-induced outcome α (x), we consider a
corresponding vector of private sector rankings; that is,
r ′ (x) :=
(
r1 (x) , . . . , r i (x) , . . . , r N (x)
)
,
where r i
(
xi
)
denotes the rank assigned by Pi to strategy profile-induced outcome
α (x). Note also that one could use a simple lexicographic ordering system, an
MCDM method (e.g. ELECTRE methods, PROMETHEE methods, AHP, TOP-
SIS) or a mathematical programming-based methodology (e.g. DEA) to obtain
these rankings.
Step 3. Identification of ordinal non-cooperative equilibria In this step, one ordi-
nal non-cooperative equilibrium (ONE) or many (ONEs) shall be identified, if
any exists. Notice that the ordered strategy profile-induced outcomes produced in
the previous step along with the corresponding vectors of private sector players
rankings; that is,
(
α (x) ; r ′ (x))
:=
(
x1, . . . , x N ; r
(
x1
)
, . . . , r
(
x N
)
, fn (x) ; r1 (x) , . . . , r N (x)
)
; x ∈ X,
are, by construction, already sorted in such a way that the one(s) on the top of
this list have the vector of private sector rankings, r ′ (x) := (r1 (x) , . . . , r N (x)),
with the smallest entries. Therefore, if a ONE exists, all the entries of r ′ (x) cor-
responding to the top-ranked α (x) or α (x)s should be equal to one; otherwise,
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a generalized Nash equilibrium of order
(
r1 (x) , . . . , r N (x)
)
would be the best
outcome of the game.
Output: One ordinal non-cooperative equilibrium (ONE) or several (ONEs), if any
exists.
As stated in the following theorem, our algorithm converges in a finite number of
steps to a Generalized Nash Equilibrium.
Theorem 2.1 Given a static non-cooperative ordinal game of complete information
involving one public sector player and several private sector players, the proposed
ordinal game theory algorithm identifies, in a finite number of iterations, an ordinal
non-cooperative equilibrium (ONE) or several (ONEs), if any exists, or a Generalized
Nash Equilibrium of a given order.
Proof In fact, the proposed algorithm could be viewed as a construction method that
builds a solution by following a finite sequence of steps, each involving a ranking task
that takes account of the preference system or perspective of a player - obviously each
ranking task requires a finite number of iterations, as the number of proposals is finite.
The final outcome is an ordered list of strategy profile-induced outcomes along with
the corresponding vectors of private sector players rankings; that is,
(α(x); r ′(x));−(x1, · · · , x N ; r(x1), · · · , r(x N ), fn(x); r1(x), · · · , r N (x)); x ∈ X,
where each(α(x); r ′(x)) takes account of all players? perspectives. Therefore, by
design, the proposed algorithm converges in a finite number of iterations and its order
of complexity depends on the choice of the ranking algorithm. The nature of the out-
come, however, is data-driven and could be oneGeneralizedNashEquilibriumof order
(1, . . . , 1); that is a ONE, several Generalized Nash Equilibria of order (1, . . . , 1); that
is, several ONEs, or a Generalized Nash Equilibrium of an orderr ′(x).
Recall that, as compared to the ordinal game theory frameworks proposed by Cruz
and Simaan [25] and Xu [26], our framework is more general in that it can model
games with any finite number of players, whereas [25] model only considers two
players and [26] model considers the cases of two and three players, respectively.
The performance evaluation of PPP projects at different stages of their life cycle
requires the specification of performance criteria and theirmeasures—often referred to
as key performance indicators (KPIs). Given the nature of PPP projects, performance
criteria are divided into two broad categories depending on the perspective fromwhich
one looks at the performance evaluation exercise, namely public sector perspective
and private sector perspective. One could further refine this classification by dividing
performance criteria into several categories depending on a more detailed classifica-
tion of stakeholders (e.g. national, regional and/or local governments, governmental
agencies, state-owned entities, private sub-contractors, private investors, financiers,
insurers). One might argue that performance criteria and measures are chosen by the
public sector, and therefore, the public sector perspective should prevail; however, for
the public sector to generate interest into the PPP project from the private sector, the
private sector perspectives should be taken account of. In this paper, we are focusing
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on the performance criteria andmeasures most relevant to the operationalization of the
proposed ordinal game theory framework for the selection of private sector partners;
therefore, only those criteria most relevant to the tendering-related phases and stages
of PPP projects are considered—see “Appendix 1” for the typical PPP project phases
and stages relevant to the pre-tendering and the tendering process [28–30]. Notice
that, at the different phases of the process, different sets of criteria are required. In
“Appendix 2” we provide the reader with a general classification of performance cri-
teria commonly used in assessing PPP projects at the tendering phase divided into two
categories depending onwhether they are used for assessing bidders or proposals—see
[31,32] for more details.
The design and evaluation of proposals involve proactive planning, which in turn
involves forecasting PPP project requirements in terms of resources as well as time
schedules. Such forecasting task is typically made based on limited information, on
the one hand, and under a set of assumptions linking the past, the present and the
future, on the other hand. Given the uncertainty that governs our business environ-
ments and the nature of forecasts that drive planning, the process of implementing a
PPP project along with its intermediate and final outcomes is generally worse or bet-
ter than originally expected—these highly likely deviations from the expected targets
are commonly referred to as downside and upside risks, respectively. In practice, the
question both public and private sectors’ players are concerned with is not whether to
take risks, but what are the “reasonable” levels of risks to take? Obviously, the answer
to this question depends on the risk appetite of the players (e.g. risk neutral, risk seek-
ing or risk averse); however, to reach a decision one needs to start by identifying and
recognizing risks, measuring and assessing them, and choosing or designing the tools
for managing them. Risk is an abstract concept which proves to be often difficult to
define andmeasure with any precision. In this paper, we adopt the following definition.
The risk associated with a PPP project is multidimensional in nature. We define the
risk associated with a specific dimension (e.g. activity, process, player, environment)
as the deviation of its actual outcome (e.g. timing, cost, price, quality, behaviour)
from its expected one. We shall refer to such deviation as the event associated with
the dimension. The risk exposure associated with an event is typically measured by
the product of the probability of the event taking place and the magnitude of the
resulting loss or gain. However, in practice, one would have to refine such measure
by taking account of the extent to which the event will have an impact on the overall
project. For example, one could classify the risk associated with an event into one of
the following categories: high probability–high impact, low probability–high impact,
high probability–low impact, and low probability–low impact. Then act upon the risk
accordingly. Hereafter, and as part of providing the necessary tools to operational-
ize our proposed framework, we provide a classification of typical risk categories
or packages facing PPP projects along with a checklist of risk factors within each
package—see “Appendix 3”. For additional references on risk packages, the reader is
referred to [33–41]. The information in “Appendix 3” is provided for guidance only,
but does not replace the risk identification stage where one has to identify the rele-
vant risks associated with a PPP project. Risk identification approaches and related
methods fall into three main categories: (1) the intuitive approach, which is often
operationalized by brainstorming to generate ideas by one or several groups and could
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make use of interviews and self-assessment techniques, nominal group techniques,
and Delphi techniques, (2) the inductive approach is concerned with “what if” type of
analyses, which is often operationalized using a combination of methodologies and
tools such as generic and project-specific checklists, interviews and surveys, nominal
group techniques, Delphi techniques, risk registers, SWOT analysis, hazard and fail-
ure analyses such as failure modes and effects criticality analysis (FMECA) and its
variants like hazard and operability studies (HAZOPS), impact analysis, Structured
What If Technique (SWIFT), Business, Political, Economic, Social and Technological
(BPEST) analysis, Political, Economic, Social, Technical, Legal and Environmental
(PESTLE) analysis, and (3) the deductive approach is concerned with “so how” type
of analyses, which is often operationalized using a combination of methodologies and
tools such as hindsight and hazard and failure analyses like fault tree analysis (FTA)
and event tree analysis (ETA) and risk registers. For more information, the reader is
referred to [42,43].
Once the relevant risk packages and the corresponding risk factors associated with
a PPP project are chosen by the relevant stakeholder(s), one would have to evalu-
ate them. In this paper, we refer to risk evaluation or assessment as the process of
measuring risk whether on a quantitative scale or a qualitative scale. A common aim
of this exercise is to determine the likely financial impact of all the risks considered
relevant to the PPP project under evaluation. Risk evaluation methodologies could be
classified into three main categories, namely qualitative methodologies, quantitative
methodologies and hybrid methodologies. Qualitative methodologies are typically
concerned with describing the likely consequences of the risks identified and con-
sidered relevant to the PPP project under evaluation, without much effort to quantify
their probability of occurrence, although a ranking of such risks that reflects “priority”
is often devised. Examples of qualitative methodologies that are commonly used or
have the potential to be used include information systems methods and tools to col-
lect, organize, store and analyse risk-related information (e.g. databases such as risk
registers, also known as risk matrices or risk logs; probability-impact tables, scenario
analysis, survey questionnaires, Fuzzy metrics), classification and clustering meth-
ods and tools to classify or categorize risks based, for example, on their probability
of occurrence, and cost and schedule impact (e.g. Delphi techniques, but quantita-
tive methods could also be used such as consensus clustering methods, constrained
clustering methods, neural networks), ranking methods to prioritize risks (e.g. Del-
phi techniques, but quantitative methods could also be used such as multi-criteria
decision analysis ranking methods), benchmarking analysis such as value-for-money
(VfM) analysis and data envelopment analysis and other methods (e.g. analysis of
inter-connected decision areas (AIDA), conflict analysis, robustness analysis, strate-
gic options development and analysis (SODA), soft systems methodology (SSM) and
the strategic choice method, value chain analysis). Quantitative methodologies, on the
other hand, are concerned with determining the likelihood of the relevant risks and
their impacts especially in terms of money and/or time. This category of quantitative
methodologies could be further divided into two sub-categories, namely deterministic
methods and probabilistic methods. Sensitivity analyses (e.g. one-factor-at-the-time
analysis, multiple-factors-at-the-time analysis, scenario analysis such as pessimistic,
realistic and optimistic scenarios) are the most commonly used deterministic meth-
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ods. Examples of probabilistic methods include decision analysis methods and tools
(e.g. decision trees, mean-end analysis, influence diagrams, objective and subjective
conditional probability models, Bayesian theory and probability distributions, sto-
chastic dominance), reliability analysis—also known as survival analysis—including
estimation of system reliability methods such as first-order reliability methods and
simulation methods (e.g. Monte Carlo simulation, Latin hyper-cube sampling). As to
hybrid methodologies, as the name suggests, they make use of a mixture of qualitative
and quantitativemethods. Formore details, the reader is referred to [33–35,39,45–51].
Once a PPP project-related risks have been identified and assessed, the next critical
step is concerned with risk allocation; to be more specific, at this stage one would have
to decide on which risks to allocate to the public sector players, which risks to allocate
to the private sector players, and which risks to share by both parties. In practice, risk
allocation is a sequential decision-making process with feedback adjustment mech-
anisms, which requires proper costing of risks and negotiation of risk premiums; in
general, however, whoever is in a better position to handle a specific risk, is respon-
sible for its management—the reader is referred to [38] for a detailed presentation
of a typical risk allocation process in PPPs along with a three-level classification of
risks that is relevant to risk allocation, namely macro-level risks, meso-level risks and
micro-level risks. As risks are shaped by the perspectives fromwhich we look at them,
some studies have investigated this aspect such as [40,41,52,53]. Quantitative analysis
and tools to assist with decision-making in risk allocation include game theory as a
modelling and analysis framework—see, for example [17].
Once a partner or consortiumof partners has been awarded aPPPcontract, the public
sector—eventually in cooperation with the private sector partner(s)—would have to
prepare the environment for the implementation of the PPP project. Such environment
preparation for a successful implementation requires one to take account of the critical
success factors (CSFs) by putting in place the related ingredients or mechanisms to
enhance the likelihood of a successful PPP. Note, however, that someCSFs aremore or
less controllable than others; therefore, in this paper we propose our own classification
of CSFs where the classification criterion is the nature of the PPP environment, that is,
internal environment versus external environment-related CSFs—see “Appendix 4”
for such classification along with a typical list of CSFs relevant to each environment.
In the next section, we provide a PPP scenario to illustrate the workings of our
proposed framework.
3 Analysis of Scenarios
In this section, we illustrate the proposed methodology by means of a realistic, but
small scale, scenario. Such scenario could be described as follows. The PPP project is
concerned with a transportation infrastructure (e.g. tram network). It involves a single
public sector player who represents several parties (e.g. city council and regional gov-
ernment) and two private sector players (e.g. supplier of vehicles or trams, consortium
supplier of the design and construction of the network). The project is operated by the
public sector represented by the city council. In addition, a couple of project-related
services are required, namely a network construction project manager supplied, for
example, by the private sector represented by a consulting firm, and tram vehicle
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testing supplied, for example, by the public sector represented by the city council. It
is assumed that the private sector players agree to a fixed-price contract and to bear
some of the project risks in exchange of an agreed upon financial compensation (e.g.
savings for the public sector). The bidding process for the PPP project requires the
private sector players to submit proposals to the public sector representative, where
each proposal consists of three contract terms, namely price, delivery time and risk.
To be more specific, price refers to the amount of money that a private sector player
is willing to receive for undertaking the project, whereas delivery time refers to the
expected time period (expressed in years) required to deliver or complete the project
and its ownership transferred to the public sector representative who will be operating
the project, and risk refers to the percentage of (e.g. operational, financial, techni-
cal) risk, say ρ, which the private sector player is willing to bear with the remaining
percentage (1 − ρ) allocated to the public sector.
In the remainder of this section, we shall focus on bids for the tram network con-
struction. A similar exercise could be performed for the bids on the supply of vehicles
or trams. Conceptually, the PPP project is modelled as an ordinal game involving a
single public sector player and a couple of private sector players. These private sector
players compete for contracting with the public sector player through the features of
their proposals, whichwill be ranked by the public sector representative whowill grant
the contract to the highest ranked player; in sum, the outcome of the game is a ranking
by the public sector representative of the private sector players’ proposals. As far as
the real-life case that inspired this research is concerned, it is also assumed that in case
of tie (i.e. both private sector players submit identical proposals), the public service
representative shall make use of additional information to break the tie such as private
sector players experiences and their track records on completing these types of project
successfully. Hereafter, we summarize the main assumptions underlying the public
sector player preference system and the private sector players’ preference systems.
3.1 Public Sector Player Preference System
The public sector representative preferences with respect to the three contract terms,
namely price, delivery time and risk, could be summarized as follows. More impor-
tance is given to price, then to risk and then to delivery time. In sum, the public
sector representative ranks proposals according to their price first. Proposals with the
same price are then ranked according to risk. Finally, proposals with the same price
and risk are ranked according to delivery time. In other words, the preference system
of the public sector player is a lexicographic ordering system with price being the
first criterion, risk being the second criterion, and delivery time being the third and
last criterion. Note that lexicographic ordering systems are complete and transitive.
Therefore, the public sector player rationality assumption is satisfied—see Sect. 2. In
addition, from a public sector perspective, proposals with lower prices are preferred
to proposals with higher prices; proposals with higher risk proportion assumed by a
private sector player are preferred to those proposals with lower risk proportions; and
proposals with shorter delivery times are preferred to proposals with longer delivery
times. Last, but not least, it is assumed that, in the case of tie (i.e. both private sector
123
J Optim Theory Appl
players submit identical proposals), the public service representative shall make use
of additional information to break the tie such as private sector players experiences
and their track records on completing this type of projects successfully. In the scenario
under consideration, it is assumed that private sector player, say P1, has a better pro-
file with respect to previous experience and its track record on completing this type
of infrastructure project successfully.
3.2 Private Sector Players’ Preference Systems
The private sector players have the following preferenceswith respect to price, delivery
time and risk sharing. Obviously, both private sector players would strictly prefer to
win the PPP contract and, therefore, would design competitive proposals; in sum, they
would adopt a rational behaviour.
In sum, private sector player P1 is assumed to have a lexicographic ordering of
his preferences with price being the first criterion, and proposals are ranked with
respect to this criterion in descending order of price, delivery time being the second
criterion, and proposals are ranked with respect to this criterion in ascending order of
delivery time, and risk being the third and last criterion, and proposals are ranked with
respect to this criterion in ascending order of the private sector risk sharing proportion.
Therefore, P1 prefers proposals with higher prices to proposals with lower prices—
this preference could be motivated by the player’s confidence that its reputation and
previous achievements would balance the higher price bid; he prefers proposals with
shorter delivery times to proposals with longer delivery times—this preference could
be motivated by the desire to minimize the impact of any unfavourable changes in the
economy over the delivery period, and he prefers proposals with lower risk sharing
proportions to proposals with higher risk sharing proportions—this preference has
obvious motivations including the control of potential additional expenses. Finally,
it is assumed that private sector player P1 has come up with three price options,
namely {£510 million, £560 million, £630 million}, two risk sharing schema, namely
{55, 60%}, and two delivery times options, namely {3 years, 4 years}. Thus, P1 has
the following set of strategies:
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(510,55%, 3) , (510,60%, 3) , (510,55%, 4) , (510,60%, 4) ,
(560,55%, 3) , (560,60%, 3) , (560,55%, 4) , (560,60%, 4) ,
(630,55%, 3) , (630,60%, 3) , (630,55%, 4) , (630, 60%, 4)
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
.
On the other hand, private sector player P2 is assumed to have a lexicographic ordering
of his preferences with risk being the first criterion, and proposals are ranked with
respect to this criterion in descending order of the private sector risk sharing proportion,
delivery time being the second criterion, and proposals are ranked with respect to
this criterion in descending order of delivery time, and price being the third and
last criterion, and proposals are ranked with respect to this criterion in ascending
order of price. Therefore, P2 prefers proposals with higher risk sharing proportions
to proposals with lower risk sharing proportions—this preference could be motivated
by the confidence of the player in its ability to manage risk in an effective manner;
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he prefers proposals with longer delivery times to proposals with shorter delivery
times—this preference could be motivated, for example, by previous commitments
of resources and suppliers’ projections of their own delivery times; and he prefers
proposals with lower prices to proposals with higher prices; that is, he prefers to bid
lower to secure the contract. Finally, it is also assumed that private sector player P2 has
come up with three price options, namely {£480million, £560million, £610million},
two risk sharing schema, namely {55, 65%}, and two delivery times options, namely
{4 years, 6 years}. Thus, P2 has the following set of strategies:
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(480,55%, 4) , (480,65%, 4) , (480,55%, 6) , (480,65%, 6) ,
(560,55%, 4) , (560,65%, 4) , (560,55%, 6) , (560,65%, 6) ,
(610,55%, 4) , (610,65%, 4) , (610,55%, 6) , (610,65%, 6)
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
.
Recall that lexicographic ordering systems are complete and transitive. Therefore, the
private sector players’ rationality assumption is satisfied—see Sect. 2.
We next apply our proposed methodology to the above ordinal game, which is
summarized in the following steps.
Step 1. Ranking of proposals from a public sector perspective Based on the public
sector player preference system and the tie breaking rule outlined above, a ranking
of the private sector players’ proposals is obtained—see Table 1. For example,
strategy profile, [(510,55%, 3); (480,55%, 4)], where P1 proposal is (510,55%, 3)
and P2 proposal is (480,55%, 4), is ranked by the public sector player according
to his or her preferences resulting in P2 being ranked first and then P1 is ranked
second, because the public sector player prefers proposals with lower prices to
those with higher prices, and price matters more than delivery time and risk—this
outcome is represented in the table by ranking:
r ((510,55%, 3) ; (480,55%, 4)) := (2, 1) .
The rest of the table is obtained in a similar way. Notice that cell (7,5) corresponds
to a strategy profile where there is a tie between the proposals of P1 and P2,
which is broken by making use of the fact that P1 has a better profile than P2 with
respect to its previous experience and its track record on completing this type of
infrastructure project successfully.
Step 2. Ranking of proposals from a private sector perspectiveThe strategy profile-
induced outcomes computed at the previous step are now ranked based on each
private sector player preference system—see Tables 2 and 3 for ranks, which are
then summarized in Table 4, where different colours are used to highlight the
rankings resulting from different preference systems of players. Notice that P1
(respectively, P2) would assign a higher ranking to those strategy profile-induced
outcomes that privilege him or her, namely those entries in Table 1 with r (x) :=
(1, 2) (respectively, r (x) := (2, 1)). However, from a computational perspective,
the ranking operation is more efficient by sorting the entries of Table 1 column
by column for P1 and row by row for P2. To be more specific, each column
(respectively, row) of Table 1 is first sorted in a lexicographic order where the first
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Table 5 List of strategy profiles including all proposals of P1 and a single proposal of P2 and the corre-
sponding induced rankings and induced potential agreements
Strategy profiles Induced ranking by P0 Induced potential
agreement
x :=
(
x1, x2
)
r (x) :=
(
r
(
x1
)
, r
(
x2
))
fn (x)
(510,55%, 3); (560,55%, 4) (1, 2) P1
(510,60%, 3); (560,55%, 4) (1, 2) P1
(510,55%, 4); (560,55%, 4) (1, 2) P1
(510,60%, 4); (560,55%, 4) (1, 2) P1
(560,55%, 3); (560,55%, 4) (1, 2) P1
(560,60%, 3); (560,55%, 4) (1, 2) P1
(560,55%, 4); (560,55%, 4) (1, 2) P1
(560,60%, 4); (560,55%, 4) (1, 2) P1
(630,55%, 3); (560,55%, 4) (2, 1) P2
(630,60%, 3); (560,55%, 4) (2, 1) P2
(630,55%, 4); (560,55%, 4) (2, 1) P2
(630,60%, 4); (560,55%, 4) (2, 1) P2
(respectively, second) entry of the vector of ranks assigned by the public sector
player is sorted in ascending order. The sorted columns (respectively, rows) are
then sorted again as many times as there are contract terms based on the preference
system of P1 (respectively, P2) in a sequential manner.
For illustration purposes, consider the fifth column of Table 1 along with the corre-
sponding proposals from P1 and P2 (i.e. strategy profiles), the induced rankings (i.e.
rankings by the public sector player P0 of the strategy profiles) and the induced poten-
tial agreements (i.e. the private sector players who made the best proposal within each
strategy profile)—see Table 5. Note that, when more than two private sector players
are considered, the strategy profiles x := (x1, x2) are replaced by x := (x1, . . . , x N )
where N denotes the number of private sector players. Note also that, when more than
three contractual terms are considered, each xi would be a vector of dimension K
where K denotes the number of contractual terms specified by the public sector.
In this case, this list is already sorted in descending order of the first entry of the
vector of ranks by the public sector. This sorted list would then have to be sorted
again in a lexicographic order based on prices first to reflect the preferences of P1 (i.e.
higher prices are preferred to lower ones), where the sorting is done within each of
the sub-lists where P1 is ranked first (respectively, second) separately, namely X11 and
X12— see Table 6.
This sorted list would then again have to be sorted in ascending order of delivery
times and then in ascending order of risk sharing proportion, which is already done
and leads to the ranking by P1 of the column entries as shown in Table 7 and Table 2.
Applying the above described logic to each column of Table 1 at a time leads to
Table 2. Also, applying the above described logic to each row of Table 1 at a time
leads to Table 3. Finally, Tables 2 and 3 are summarized into Table 4 for presentation
purposes.
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Table 6 List of strategy profiles sorted according to the preference of P1 on price
Strategy profiles Induced ranking by P0 Induced potential
agreement
x :=
(
x1, x2
)
r (x) :=
(
r
(
x1
)
, r
(
x2
))
fn (x)
(560,55%, 3); (560,55%, 4) (1, 2) P1
(560,60%, 3); (560,55%, 4) (1, 2) P1
(560,55%, 4); (560,55%, 4) (1, 2) P1
(560,60%, 4); (560,55%, 4) (1, 2) P1
(510,55%, 3); (560,55%, 4) (1, 2) P1
(510,60%, 3); (560,55%, 4) (1, 2) P1
(510,55%, 4); (560,55%, 4) (1, 2) P1
(510,60%, 4); (560,55%, 4) (1, 2) P1
(630,55%, 3); (560,55%, 4) (2, 1) P2
(630,60%, 3); (560,55%, 4) (2, 1) P2
(630,55%, 4); (560,55%, 4) (2, 1) P2
(630,60%, 4); (560,55%, 4) (2, 1) P2
Table 7 List of strategy profile-induced outcomes sorted and ranked according to P1 preferences
Strategy profiles Induced ranking by P0 Induced potential
agreement
P1 Ranking
x :=
(
x1, x2
)
r (x) :=
(
r
(
x1
)
, r
(
x2
))
fn (x)
(560,55%, 3); (560,55%, 4) (1, 2) P1 1
(560,60%, 3); (560,55%, 4) (1, 2) P1 2
(560,55%, 4); (560,55%, 4) (1, 2) P1 3
(560,60%, 4); (560,55%, 4) (1, 2) P1 4
(510,55%, 3); (560,55%, 4) (1, 2) P1 5
(510,60%, 3); (560,55%, 4) (1, 2) P1 6
(510,55%, 4); (560,55%, 4) (1, 2) P1 7
(510,60%, 4); (560,55%, 4) (1, 2) P1 8
(630,55%, 3); (560,55%, 4) (2, 1) P2 9
(630,60%, 3); (560,55%, 4) (2, 1) P2 10
(630,55%, 4); (560,55%, 4) (2, 1) P2 11
(630,60%, 4); (560,55%, 4) (2, 1) P2 12
Step 3. Identification of ordinal non-cooperative equilibria Given the rankings of
strategy profile-induced outcomes by the private sector players P1 and P2—see
Table 4—the strategy profile-induced outcome ((630, 55%, 3) ; (480, 65%, 6) ;
(1, 1)) is the unique optimal non-cooperative equilibrium (ONE) of the game.
Output: Optimal generalized Nash equilibrium ((630, 55%, 3) ; (480, 65%, 6) ;
(1, 1)).
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This outcome could be used by both the public sector representative and the private
sector players for decision-making. In sum, from the private sector players’ perspec-
tive, the optimal generalized Nash equilibrium suggests that player P1 would be better
off putting forward proposal (630, 55%, 3) and player P2 would be better off putting
forward proposal (480, 65%, 6). As to the public sector perspective, the optimal gen-
eralized Nash equilibrium suggests that the proposal of P2 is more attractive than the
proposal of P1 except for the delivery time. In this simplified situation, common sense
suggests that the PPP contract would be awarded to player P2; however, in practice,
this solution might suggest that further negotiation is necessary to avoid the potential
drawbacks of a delivery time twice as much as the one proposed by player P1.
4 Conclusions
This paper is concerned with public–private partnership (PPP) projects and the choice
of private sector partners. Unlike previous Cardinal game theory-based analyses of
PPP projects with respect to a range of decisions, this paper proposes an ordinal
game theory-based framework. In addition, we propose tools for its operationalization
including a general algorithm for ranking proposals that take account of the different
perspectives of all players. To be more specific, the proposed algorithm is designed
to find an optimal generalized Nash equilibrium. We illustrated the application of this
algorithm on a realistic, yet small scale, scenario. The main features of the proposed
algorithm could be summarized as follows. First, it can handle any number of private
sector players and any number of contractual terms and related performance criteria.
Second, it determines a single ranking of proposals or bidders that take account of
multiple performance criteria and reflects both the public sector perspective and the
private sector perspective. Third, it can be used by the private sector players to analyse
any set of potential proposals most likely to be submitted by bidders and to assist
with the design and choice of bidding strategies. Fourth, it can be used by the public
sector player to analyse any set of potential proposals most likely to be submitted
under any set of contractual terms and to assist with the choice of a realistic set of
contractual terms and their performance measures. Last but not least, the proposed
algorithm provides a means for automating the analysis process, which would save a
valuable amount of time for practitioners. In sum, the proposed ordinal game theory
framework is intended to assist both the public sector and the private sector with the
analysis of scenarios and to guide decision-making.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Appendix 1
See Table 8.
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Table 8 Typical PPP projects phases and stages
Phases Stages
Identification of service needs
and preparation of business
case
Identify business needs and delivery options
Choose performance criteria and measures and their relative importance
for delivery options and assess them
Prepare business case—including an adequate legal framework and a
proper risk allocation scheme, and reference project and setup project
team and board
Invitation and pre-selection of
bidders
Advertise project and invite expressions of interest
Choose performance criteria and measures and their relative importance
for assessing bidders and pre-qualify and shortlist bidders
Invite bidders for negotiation and submission of proposals
Proposals assessment and
further negotiation
Choose performance criteria and measures and their relative importance
for assessing proposals and pre-qualify and shortlist proposals
Invite bidders of shortlisted proposals for further negotiation and
submission of final proposals
Selection of partner(s) and
contract award
Refine performance criteria and measures and their relative importance
for assessing final proposals and assess them
Perform final round of negotiation, select partner(s) and finalize contract
Appendix 2
See Table 9.
Table 9 General classification of performance criteria most commonly used in assessing PPP projects at
the pre-tendering phase and the tendering process
Performance criteria
packages
Sample of performance criteria
Main performance criteria packages and corresponding criteria for bidders
Financial criteria package Financial strength of private sector partner; sound financial analysis
and net present value; total investment schedule; income schedule
(tariff/toll setup and adjustment); ability to address commercial risk
Technical criteria package Qualification and experience of private sector partner and its SC
partners; design standard and delivery scheme; quality MGT
Social and environmental
criteria package
Conformance to laws and regulations including health and safety;
environmental performance; social performance
Managerial criteria package Project MGT skills, working relationships with partners; leadership
and allocation of responsibilities
Main performance criteria for proposals
Efficiency On-time delivery and usage of resources
Effectiveness Under-budget delivery and cost control
Quality According to specifications delivery
Image/reputation According to stakeholders expectations delivery
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Appendix 3
See Table 10.
Table 10 General classification of risk categories for PPP projects along with a CheckList of risk factors
Risk packages Sample of risk factors
Political Political climate (e.g. instability of government, political and/or public support
or opposition, corruption; public sector interference in privatized
facilities/services; reliability of the government in honouring payments or
executing the agreement; adverse government action or inaction; uncertainty of
government policy); political force majeure events; expropriation and
nationalization; termination of concession by government
Legal Lack of national PPP legislation (e.g. non-standardized and non-transparent
tendering process); ambiguity of legislation; change in legislation (e.g.
changes in fiscal legislation such as tax regulation, law enforcement);
Inconsistency of national, regional and local legislation; inefficient legal
system; changes in industrial code of practice; improper contracts and
contractual risk; third-party tort liability; ownership of assets; improper special
purpose vehicle; legal barriers (e.g. trade restrictions on imports/exports,
currency transfer restrictions); environmental protection legislation
Economic Influential economic events; inflation; interest rate; foreign currency exchange;
currency inconvertibility; economic force majeure events (e.g. recession,
financial crisis, economic sanction)
Market Change in market demand; change in tariff; insufficient income (e.g. operational
revenues below expectation); fluctuation of material cost by private sector or
government; supply of raw materials monopoly risk; availability of labour and
materials; availability and quality of infrastructural facilities; competition (e.g.
exclusive right); unavailability of financial instruments to raise funds; poor
financial market
Finance Availability of funds; financial cost; construction cost overrun; project loans;
debt risk; credit risk; insolvency of subcontractors; insolvency of concession
company; the creditworthiness of the public and private sectors players (e.g.
lenders such as government and governmental organizations; investment firms
and financial institutions, insurance companies); changes in financial
consortium composition; improper financial audit
Tendering Tendering cost; bidding risk; project approval and permit
Design of project Improper design (e.g. subjective evaluation and design of the concession period,
tariff structure, market demand, etc.); changes in design; quality of inputs (e.g.
materials); technology (e.g. unproven engineering techniques); site availability
and safety; land acquisition and use; protection of geological and historical
objects; technical consortium ability to perform its obligations; risk premium
(e.g. contingency allowance or fund)
Implementation of
project
Operator default (e.g. non-completion; interruption of operations); quality of
operations (e.g. construction operations); operating productivity;
commissioning risk (e.g. delay in supply; delays in operations); organization
and coordination; design deficiency and changes in design at construction
stage; environmental damage; government delay in issuing licence; risk
premium (e.g. contingency fund)
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Table 10 continued
Risk packages Sample of risk factors
Operational management
of project
Operator default (e.g. interruption of operations); quality of operations
(e.g. tangible and intangible products); operating productivity;
frequency and cost of maintenance; condition of facilities; delays in
and prolonged downtime during operations; organization and
coordination; environmental damage; government delay in licence
renewal; risk premium (e.g. contingency allowance)
Client Transaction risk; service quality and efficiency; breach of contract by
contractor; social effects; technology transfer; project stability after
transfer
Other Force majeure (e.g. circumstances that are out of the control of both
public and private partners such as weather, earthquake, flood);
residual risk (e.g. residual assets to be transferred to the government
at the end of the concession period)
Appendix 4
See Table 11.
Table 11 General classification of critical success factors for PPP projects
CSF packages Sample of CSFs
PPP’s internal
environment-related
CSFs package
Acceptable balance between stakeholders’ conflicting goals and
objectives/multi-benefit objectives [54]
Competitive and transparent processes, e.g. bidding/procurement and
negotiation [55,56]
Project technical soundness and feasibility [57–59]
Thorough and realistic assessment of costs and benefits [57,60,61]
Well organized and committed public agency that negotiate on behalf of
the public sector [62–65]
Strong private consortium with as many strengths (e.g. well established,
have won PFI contracts) and as few weaknesses as possible [55,58]
Good governance, e.g. good standard of project administration [57]
Commitment and responsibility of public and private sectors, as
represented by the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), and beyond to cover
parent companies and their steering boards [66–68]
Shared authority between public and private sectors to enhance long-term
alliance [66,67]
Appropriate risk allocation and risk sharing [54,57]
Government guarantees, e.g. tax holiday over a pre-specified period
[57,66–69]
Favourable local, regional and national legal framework, e.g. enabling
legislation related to planning, environment, employment, health and
safety, corporate and commercial law, construction, finance and
insurance [33,61,62,64,70]
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Table 11 continued
CSF packages Sample of CSFs
Technology transfer [57]
Ability of PPP partners to easily access financial markets to raise funds
with lower financial costs [55,57,71,72]
PPP’s external
environment-related
CSFs package
Acceptable balance between Stakeholders’ conflicting goals and
objectives, e.g. third-party stakeholders such as international NGOs [54]
Social (public) support and political support [57,69]
Favourable international legal framework, e.g. exchange rates [73]
Stable macro-economic conditions [57,73]
Good governance, e.g. sound economic policy [57,74]
Availability of suitable and adequate financial markets [55,57,71,72]
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